The rational as reasonable : a treatise on legal justification

The rational as reasonable : a treatise on legal justification

The rational as reasonable : a treatise on legal justification

Law in general. Comparative and uniform law. Jurisprudence > Jurisprudence. Philosophy and theory of law > K290

Edition Details

  • Creator or Attribution (Responsibility): Aulis Aarnio
  • Language: English
  • Jurisdiction(s): Netherlands
  • Publication Information: Dordrecht ; Boston : D. Reidel ; Norwell, MA, U.S.A. : Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers, ©1987
  • Material: Internet resource
  • Type: Book, Internet Resource
  • Series title: Law and philosophy library.
  • Permalink: (Stable identifier)

Short Description

XIX, 276 pages : ILlustrations ; 23 cm.

Purpose and Intended Audience

Useful for students learning an area of law, The rational as reasonable : a treatise on legal justification is also useful for lawyers seeking to apply the law to issues arising in practice.

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Main Contents

I: Introduction.- 1. The Point of Departure.- 1.1. The Routine Cases and the Hard Cases.- 1.2. The Dilemma of the Decision-Maker.- 1.3. On the Responsibility to Justify the Decisions.- 1.4. Legalism Contra Anti-Legalism.- 2. A Scientific Approach to the Contents of Legal Norms.- 2.1. The Scholar and the Judge.- 2.2. Legal Dogmatics and Social Sciences.- 2.3. Legal Dogmatics and Legal Practice.- 2.3.1. Normal Legal Practice.- 2.3.2. Judicial Practice.- 3. The Concept of Legal Dogmatics – A More Precise Formulation.- 4. The Angle of Approach and the Basic Problems.- II: The Ontology of Law.- 1. General Remarks.- 2. The Ontology of Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics.- 3. The Validity of a Legal Norm.- 3.1. Wroblewski’s Three Approaches.- 3.2. Systematic Validity.- 3.3. The Efficacy of Legal Norms.- 3.4. The Acceptability of a Legal Norm.- III: The Methodology of Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics.- 1. Basic Concepts.- 1.1. Two Research Strategies.- 1.2. A Norm Statement and an Interpretative Statement.- 1.2.1. The Concept of the Norm Statement.- 1.2.2. Conclusion.- 1.2.3. A Meaning Statement and an Interpretation Statement.- 1.2.4. A Norm Standpoint and an Interpretation Standpoint.- 1.2.5. Summary.- 1.3. The Concept of the Norm.- 2. A General Characterization of Interpretation and Interpretation Theory.- 2.1. Interpretation as a Hermeneutic Process.- 2.2. The Special Nature of Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics.- 3. The Sources of Law and the Directives of Legal Interpretation.- 3.1. On the Concept of the Sources of Law.- 3.1.1. The Source of Information.- 3.1.2. The Source of Reasoning.- 3.2. The List of the Sources of Law.- 3.2.1. The Finnish Catalogue of the Sources.- 3.2.2. General Remarks.- 3.3. The Categorization of the Sources of Law.- 3.3.1. The Bindingness of the Sources of Law.- 3.3.2. Authoritative Reasons and Substantial Reasons.- 3.4. Directives of Legal Interpretation.- 3.4.1. The Order of Preference of the Sources of Law.- 3.4.2. The Standards of the Reasoning Procedure.- 4. Justification of the Interpretative Standpoint: Structural Analysis.- 4.1. The Point of Departure: Disagreement on the Result of the Interpretation.- 4.2. The Scope for Interpretation: Gaps and Conflicts in the Legal Order.- 4.3. The Procedure of Discourse.- 4.4. Internal and External Justification.- 4.5. The Structure of the Ex-Justification Procedure.- 4.6. An Example of the Justification Procedure.- 4.6.1. Travaux Preparatoires.- 4.6.2. Systemic Interpretation.- 4.6.3. Court Decisions as Reasons.- 4.6.4. On the Doctrinal Opinion.- 4.6.5. Practical Reasons.- 4.6.6. Summary.- 4.7. The Relation Between the Systematization and the Interpretation of Legal Norms.- 4.7.1. The Concept of Systematization.- 4.7.2. An Example of Systematization: An Analysis of the Position of the Heir.- IV: The Acceptability of an Interpretative Statement.- 1. The Principle of the One Right Answer.- 1.1. A Terminological Clarification.- 1.2. Examples of the Doctrines of the One Right Answer.- 1.2.1. Ronald Dworkin’s Theory.- 1.2.2. Norm Statements as Norm Propositions.- Norm Statements as Predictions.- The Specific Nature of Legal Predictions.- On the Alf Ross’ Predictive Theory.- Ilkka Niiniluoto’s Approach.- Norm Propositions as Technical Norms.- General Remarks.- Secondary Technical Norms.- Primary Technical Norms.- 2. Acceptability and Rationality.- 2.1. The General Preconditions of the Justification of an Interpretative Standpoint.- 2.2 The Concept of Rational Acceptability.- 2.3 Why Be Rational?.- 2.4 The General Conditions of Rational Discourse.- 2.4.1 The Point of Departure.- 2.4.2 The Basic Principles and Rules of D-Rationality.- Consistency-Rules.- Efficiency-Rules.- Sincerity-Rules.- Generalization-Rules.- Support-Rules.- 2.4.3. The Rules of the Burden of Proof.- Procedural Rules of the Burden of Proof.- Material Rules of the Burden of Proof.- 2.4.4 Summary.- 2.5. Interpretations and Evaluations.- 2.6. Knowledge, Certainty and Form of Life.- 2.7. The Audience and the Form of Life.- 2.7.1. Perelman’s Theory of the Audience.- 2.7.2. Some Clarifications.- The Concrete Audience.- The Ideal Audience.- 2.7.3. Rational Acceptability as a Regulative Principle for Legal Dogmatics.- Epilogue.- Notes.- Abbreviations.

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